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The operating conditions of modern warships, in the natural sea environment, have a significant influence on their 
survivability in the event that watertight integrity is lost. Up to now, the consideration of sea and weather conditions 
has been implicitly accounted for in a naval ship’s damaged stability assessment. This paper outlines a probabilistic 
approach to assessing a naval ship’s damage stability, in which some of the limitations of the currently used damage 
stability criteria are identified, including the validity of the assumption of moderate sea states at the time of damage. 
An investigation into the operability of a frigate design found that there is a significant increase in the risk of a ship’s 
loss when changing the operational area from the North Atlantic to the North Pacific. A remarkable additional finding 
of the study showed that the assumed distribution for the damage penetration has no significant effect on the ship’s 
survivability due to the way modern combatants are designed.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
A Attained subdivision index 
b Non-dimensional damage penetration 
B Maximum Beam 
Hs Significant wave height 
Lsk Sure kill length 
Lss Sure save length 
pi Probability of compartment(s) i flooding after damage 
Sf Survivability of ship particular function, F 
si Local survival index 
x Non-dimensional longitudinal damage position 
y Non-dimensional damage length 
roll Rollback angle 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Surface combatants such as corvettes, frigates, destroyers and 
cruisers differ greatly from other ship categories in that they are 
designed and built to support high-end combat operations while 
operating in hostile environments. A passenger or merchant 
vessel must be able to withstand accidental damage from collision 
or grounding whereas a surface combatant must be able to 
withstand the effects of purposely-incurred damages caused by 
sophisticated modern anti-ship weapons. Due to this survivability 
and the ability to ‘fight hurt’ is a vital design objective for surface 
combatants. 
One of the main contributors to the survivability of a surface ship 
is her vulnerability to weapon effects and as such, the damage 
stability and floatation characteristics have a direct influence on 
the vulnerability of the vessel. The role of the designer is 
therefore to minimize the ships vulnerability through optimal 
watertight subdivision by considering a large amount of damage 
cases and operational scenarios. Such scenarios should take into 
consideration the harsh environmental conditions in which 
modern surface ships are expected to operate. In addition to 
subdivision, vulnerability can be reduced through methods such 
as hardening of the hull however; both methods face constraints 
such as space requirements for vital systems and weight 
limitations.  
Most major navies assess the damage stability of their vessels 
using a variation of the empirically defined criteria proposed by 
Sarchin and Goldberg (1962). The semi-empirical  deterministic 
criteria are based largely on WWII battle damage experience and 
have been criticised as being outdated  (Surko, 1994). The criteria 
used by major navies such as the U.S. Navy (USN) and Royal 
Navy (RN) have been reviewed over the years; however, no 
significant changes have been made. Although the criteria have 
served their purpose to date, there are serious concerns about their 
limitations and applicability to modern naval ships.  Some of the 
shortfalls of the criteria include (Surko, 1994); 
 The capability of modern warships to survive damage 
from current threats, in demanding environmental 
conditions, is not known 
 Modern hull forms and construction techniques differ 
greatly from the ships used to determine the criteria 
 Assumption of moderate wind and sea conditions at the 
time of damage 
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This suggests that neither the designer nor operator have a clear 
understanding of the survivability performance or operational 
limitations of a vessel. It is well known that the operation and 
safety of a ship largely depends on its behaviour in waves, 
consequently the vulnerability of the vessel is therefore affected 
by the sea state at the time of damage. The Falklands conflict 
highlighted the harsh environments in which modern surface 
combatants are required to operate and survive.  
Current deterministic criteria (shown in Table 1) imply a 
moderate sea state at the time of damage (HS = 8ft), which is 
independent of ship’s size and operating profile. However, in 
order to adequately represent the harsh environments which could 
be faced, a survival sea state must be directly specified for the 
ship under investigation at the time of damage. This will allow a 
rational assessment of vessel operability in terms of survivability 
for a specific sea environment. In addition to the limitation of 
moderate sea states, the current deterministic criteria fall short 
through the application of a defined damage length, which results 
in only a predetermined number of damage scenarios being 
assessed. In practice, due to the large diversity of modern threats, 
the damage extent is random and can vary extensively in location 
and magnitude, thus all probable damages should be assessed to 
give the designer a full understanding of the vessels survivability 
performance. Currently the German Navy is the only major navy 
know to include a probabilistic assessment of survival in their 
criteria (BV 1030-1). However, this is only conducted when the 
vessel fails to achieve the outlined the deterministic criteria and 
is used to aid in decision-making.  
In contrast to the current naval standards, which have slowly 
progressed over the years, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has made significant advances in upgrading 
the safety standards of passenger and merchant vessels.  The 
acceptance of the new harmonized probabilistic damage stability 
framework of SOLAS 2009, for the damage stability assessment 
of passenger and dry cargo vessels, shows that the maritime 
industry and regulatory bodies are convinced this is the right way 
forward.  
Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2004) previously presented a 
methodology for the probabilistic damaged stability assessment 
of naval combatants and its application to design optimisation. 
The methodology, which is presented herein, addresses several of 
the shortfalls of the current deterministic criteria and its 
application. The presented probabilistic methodology requires 
that a survival sea state is explicitly defined, which enables the 
survivability performance in different operational areas to be 
evaluated. Furthermore, the methodology allows the 
quantification of the risk that the vessel will be lost due to 
damage. Thus, minimal risk can become a design objective and 
the surface ship can be optimised to minimise risk while still 
being efficient and economical. 
This paper extends the design concept presented earlier by 
Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2004, 2013) for the assessment 
of survivability of surface combatants after damage. In this 
respect, a study was undertook in order to determine which 
damage penetration probability distribution is most suitable for 
the application to naval ships.  A further study aimed to quantify 
any differences in risk between operating in the North Atlantic, 
where many warships were traditionally designed to operate, and 
the North Pacific. The probabilistic methodology was applied to 
the damage stability assessment of a generic frigate operating in 
specified areas at the time of damage. 
SURVIVABILITY 
Surface combatants are designed to operate in hostile 
environments in which sophisticated sensors and weapon systems 
have been designed to detect, target and engage them. In such 
Criteria UK Defstan 02-900 U.S.N DDS 079-1 GERMANY BV 1030-1 
  LWL < 30m 1 Compartment 1 Compartment 1 Compartment 
Damage Length LWL > 30m 2 Comp or at least 6m 2 Comp or at least 6m 18% LWL -3.6m  (Not exceeding 18m) 
  LWL > 92m Max{15%LWL or 21m} 15% LWL - 
Permeability 
Watertight void 97% 95% 98% 
Accommodation 95% 95% 95% 
Machinery 85% 85-95% 85% 
Stores etc. 80-95% 60-95% 80% 
Stability & 
Reserve 
Buoyancy 
roll 15°  10°  (for 5000t ship) - 
Angle of list or loll  < 20°  List < 15°  <25°  with 40kts wind 
Area A1 > 1.4 A2 > 1.4 A2 >1.4 A2 
Longitudinal GM > 0 - - 
Buoyancy 
Longitudinal trim less than 
required to cause down-
flooding 
3in margin line to bulkhead deck 
Table 1. 
Current UK and US Damaged Stability Criteria for Surface Combatants 
 Boulougouris                   Assessment of survivability of surface combatants after damage in the sea environment   3 
 
environments, it is vital that the ship maintains its ability to 
remain mission capable even in the event of being damaged.  
The capability of a surface combatant to continue to carry out its 
designated mission in a threat environment is referred to as 
survivability. There are two main aspects, which both influence 
the overall probability of survival: 
 Susceptibility – Inability of the ship to avoid being 
damaged in operation and is also referred to as the 
probability of being hit (PH) 
 Vulnerability – Inability of the ship to withstand the 
effects of a threat weapon and is also referred to as the 
probability of serious damage or loss when hit (PK/H) 
The product of susceptibility and vulnerability can therefore 
mathematically describe the probability of a kill. Hence, the 
mathematical relationship between survivability (PS), 
susceptibility (PH) and vulnerability is as follows (Ball & 
Calvano, 1994); 
/
1 ( )
S H K H
P P P    ( 1 ) 
Susceptibility is made up of all the factors which expose the ship 
to a threat weapons effects, such as its signatures. In order for an 
aggressor to successfully score a hit on a surface combatant they 
must first detect, classify and target the vessel followed by a 
successful launch and engagement of a weapon (Ball and 
Calvano, 1994). This sequence of events is referred to as the ‘kill 
chain.’  The ability of a surface combatant to disrupt and break 
the threats kill chain is therefore directly related to its  
susceptibility. The fundamental means of susceptibility reduction 
is through reducing the detectability of the ship. This can be 
achieved through minimizing its signatures such as its Radar 
cross section (RCS). However even the stealthiest vessel can have 
its position revealed through electronic emissions e.g. external 
communication attempts or through making radar scans.  A 
number of different hard and soft kill methods can also be utilized 
to break the kill chain e.g. jamming, decoys, close in weapons 
system (CIWS) etc.  
Vulnerability is the post hit aspect of a naval ships survivability 
and is the degree to which a hit or multiple hits can cause serious 
damage. The primary effect of a threat weapon such as an Air to 
Surface Missile (ASM) is the initial explosion, the resulting high-
pressure wave will damage and destroy nearby structures and 
equipment. The secondary effects include fire and progressive 
flooding which can be more detrimental to the ship than the initial 
blast. Following a hit there are several different levels of a ship 
kill which can occur, in this case the definition given by Ball & 
Calvano (1994) is referred to;  
 System Kill – damage of one or more compartments 
which leads to the failure of a ship system. 
 Mission Area Kill – damage which leads to the loss of 
a mission critical area such as AAW 
 Mobility Kill – damage which leads to the ship being 
immobilised through the loss of propulsion or steering. 
 Total Ship Kill – damage which leads to the loss of the 
ship through insufficient buoyancy, loss of transverse 
stability or abandonment due to fire.  
The focus of this paper is on the assessment of vulnerability to 
flooding and from herein a ship kill will refer to a total ship kill. 
As descried by Ball & Calvano there is a hierarchy of different 
ship kills; a system kill can easily lead to a mission area, mobility 
or total kill. Thus, optimal subdivision and hardening of vital 
spaces is used to limit the extent of damage and also prevent 
secondary effects such as fire and flooding from spreading. A 
naval ships vulnerability is dependent on its size, subdivision, 
armouring, location of equipment and the degree of redundancy 
available. “Cheap kills” should be avoided through protection of 
magazines and weapon stores from weapon effects.  
It has always been favourable to shoot the ‘archer’ before he has 
the chance to fire his ‘arrows’ in combat, due to this some navies 
have focused their attention on susceptibility reduction. This 
allows them to engage a threat before they can be engaged or 
avoid detection all together. Some naval design philosophies have 
included the ‘design for peace’ concept, as the probability of 
sustaining damage during operations in peacetime is very low. 
They will therefore accept that in the event of a hit the vessel will 
be out of action for some time or have limited participation in the 
operation. However the sophistication and diversity of modern 
threats implies that even with the advances in stealth and self-
defence technology naval combatants can expect to be hit by anti-
ship missiles (and mines and torpedoes) in substantial numbers 
(Harney, 2010). When combined with the fact that naval fleet 
sizes are shrinking it is clear that the ability to absorb multiple 
hits and ‘fight hurt’ is more important than ever.  
Therefore, there is a need to assess vulnerability from the early 
design stages so that any vulnerabilities in the design can be 
identified and rectified before parts of the design start to become 
fixed. The current damage stability criteria used by most of the 
major navies treat the vulnerability of the ship as a property with 
a deterministic outcome, namely pass or fail. This approach does 
not allow the quantification of the level or survivability, which is 
a rational probabilistic quantity, which makes it difficult to 
compare alternate designs and impossible to optimise for 
enhanced survivability.  
ENVIRONMENT 
It is evident that the operating conditions of modern warships, 
such as sea state, have a significant influence on their 
survivability, but this is difficult to assess when dealing with 
traditional deterministic approaches. This is due to the sea 
conditions at the time of damage being implicitly accounted for 
within the current deterministic damage stability criteria.  
The criteria currently used by the USN and RN assume moderate 
sea states at the time of damage which includes sea states up to 
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and including sea state 4 (8ft wave height). However, these 
moderate conditions are readily exceeded in areas such as the 
North Atlantic and North Pacific (Surko, 1994). A database of 
reported sea states from RN and Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) 
vessels showed that RN ships spent approximately 24% of their 
time at sea states greater than 4 between 1968 and 2000  
(Heywood & Smith, 2009).  
Hence, this underlying assumption of sea state fails to represent 
the harsh environments in which a surface combatant is expected 
to survive. Unlike merchant vessels, a surface combatant cannot 
chose whether to sail or change course to avoid harsh 
environment. Due to requirements for a surface combatant to 
remain in a mission area, it is crucial from a survivability 
standpoint to account for the expected environmental conditions 
in these areas. Therefore, sea states for the appropriate operational 
areas at the time of damage should be directly accounted for 
within the damage stability assessment.  
Due to the wide variety of areas which a surface combatant can 
be expected to operate, it is essential that the most likely 
operational areas and those critical from a survival point of view 
are identified.  A survivability envelope approach can be used 
which defines a range of sea state conditions in which the ship is 
required to survive. This envelope would consist of extreme sea 
state data for the identified areas. This could include areas from 
the calmer South China Sea to the harsh environments of the 
North Pacific.  
In this paper a mathematical model is presented for calculating 
ship survivability which allows for a specific survival sea state in 
the case of damage to be input (Boulougouris & Papanikolaou, 
2004,2013). The application of this methodology opens the 
possibility to assess ship survivability on the basis of mission 
performance requirements such as the sea conditions faced in 
mission areas. The method was applied to a generic frigate, which 
meets the relevant existing deterministic criteria. Several 
different areas of operation were considered in order to observe 
the influence of operational area, or sea state, on the survivability.   
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2004, 2013) previously 
presented a methodology for the probabilistic damaged stability 
assessment and its application to design optimisation. It is based 
on the fundamentals of the probabilistic damage stability concept 
for passenger vessels introduced by Wendel (1960) and its 
derivatives (IMO Resolution A.265; IMO MSC.19 (58); IMO 
MSC.216 (82)) which are used to assess the ships level of safety 
after damage. The probabilistic approach uses the probability of 
survival after damage as a measure of the ships safety in the 
damaged condition.  The approach considers the following 
probabilities of events as being relevant to the ships damage 
stability;   
 The probability that a compartment or group of 
compartments i may be flooded (damaged), pi. 
 The probability that the ship will survive after flooding 
of the compartment or group of compartments i under 
consideration, si. 
The p factor is purely dependant on the geometry of the watertight 
arrangement of the ship whereas the s factor is dependent on the 
calculated stability after damage. The total probability of survival 
is expressed by the attained subdivision index, A, and is the given 
by the sum of the product of pi and si for each compartment and 
compartment group, i along the ships length. 
i i
i
A p s   ( 2 ) 
In order for a vessel to comply with the IMO probabilistic method 
for passenger and cargo ships (IMO MSC.216 (82)) the attained 
subdivision index must be greater than or equal to the required 
index. This ensures that the vessel is designed with an acceptable 
level of risk. The required attained index is based on the number 
of passengers carried, safety equipment on-board and the length 
of subdivision. The required index (R) of the ship is consistent 
with the mean value of the attained index (A) from a sample of 
existing ships, which supposedly offer an acceptable level of risk. 
This consists of ships of a similar size and number of passengers, 
which have acceptable damage stability/ survival characteristics. 
Similarly, for warships an acceptable level of risk should be 
specified by either the owner (navy) or approval authority 
(NATO/ classification society).  
For naval vessels there is a probability that the ship will be 
targeted, engaged and take a hit leading to the flooding of one or 
more compartments. The damage may occur at any point along 
the ship’s hull and can vary extensively is magnitude. The extent 
of damage is dependent on both the characteristics of the target 
(ship) and the threat weapon. As the survivability of the vessel is 
determined by the vulnerability and susceptibility, the probability 
distribution for damage of a naval ship relates these 
characteristics.  
The probability of survival of a particular function of the ship, Sf, 
can be extracted from the total attained index, which represents 
ship’s floatability and stability after damage. If j*={j1, j2, j3,.., jn} 
is the set of compartments that host all systems of the particular 
function F, then the damage to any compartment which is 
included in j* will impair the ship from function F. Therefore, the 
probability of survival of the particular function, Sf, is calculated 
using the following formula: 
  ( 3 ) 
where j are all damage cases, which 
include the compartment set j*. For example, Sf can represent the 
ships mobility function where j* will represent the group of 
compartments which house the ships propulsion system.  
Determining pi 
 
i j
jjiif spspS ..
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The probability of a damage case occurring is based on the 
longitudinal, transverse and vertical damage probability damage 
density distributions. Initially the longitudinal damage extent will 
be discussed. 
During the initial stages of a naval ship’s design, when there is a 
lack of refined information for the threat’s signature distribution 
along the ship it can be assumed that the probability of weapon 
impact along the hull follows a basic mathematical distribution, 
such as the piecewise linear distribution. Boulougouris and 
Papanikolaou (2004) propose that for air-to-surface missile 
(ASM) threats, a piecewise linear distribution with maximum 
probability amidships can be used. As both the ships radar profile 
and heat emissions due to machinery and exhaust are highest at 
amidships, this is the most likely aim point of the weapon.  For 
contact mines, a linear distribution can be assumed (Harmsen & 
Krikke, 2000). Thus the impact point probability density function 
in the missile’s case with a piecewise linear distribution is; 
 
  ( 4 ) 
 
The damage length probability density distribution is based on the 
concept of the Damage Function used in the theory of Defence 
Analysis (Przemieniecki, 1994). The well-known lognormal 
distribution is considered the most appropriate for this case. 
Therefore, the damage length probability density distribution is 
given by the following formula; 
 
( 5 ) 
 
 
Where; 
 
 
 
 
Where; LSK is the sure kill length, which means that d (LSK) 
=0.98, LSS is the sure save length, which means d (LSS) =0.02 
and zSS is a constant equal to 1.45222. For defining the damage 
extent range, it is a common approach in naval ship design to 
consider 2 or 3 damaged compartments around the detonation 
compartment, especially in the absence of blast resistant 
bulkheads (Erkel & Galle, 2003). Estimates that are more 
detailed may result from a careful risk assessment based on live 
firing tests analysis or the analysis of data from actual 
engagements. Other methods include empirical formulas linking 
the damage range with the type and weight of the warhead or 
from the use of damage lengths/extents defined in current 
deterministic damage stability regulations. In the latter case, 
which is the one proposed by Boulougouris and Papanikolaou 
(2004), a first approximation of the LSS can be taken according 
to naval codes DefStan 02-900 and DDS-079 as 0.15L (see 
Table 2). The authors state that the LSK can be assumed equal to 
0.02L.  
By combining the impact point and damage length density 
functions the probability of damage lying between the 
boundaries x1 and x2 or a naval ship’s compartments is; 
  (1) 
  ( 6 ) 
 
The equations resulting from substituting Dam(y) and Imp(x) into 
equation 6 were presented in Boulougouris and Papanikolaou 
(2004).  
Transverse Distribution 
In the case of the transverse extent of damage, it is well known 
that the damage penetration from air delivered weapons can 
extend across the full beam in the case of smaller vessels. The 
damage penetration is dependent on both the threat weapon 
characteristics and the characteristics of the vessel. In the case of 
the threat weapons the main factors include the size of the 
warhead, type of fuse (e.g. contact or time delay) and if it is a 
fragmentation weapon or just high explosive. The internal 
structure of the target vessel has a great influence on whether the 
explosion will be contained, or extend across multiple 
compartments. In addition, the volume of the compartment in 
which the warhead detonates has an influence on the blast 
pressure waves, which result in the most damage. 
Due to the complex nature of the problem, it is reasonable to 
assume that the transverse extent of damage follows a basic 
mathematical distribution in the initial stages of design. In this 
case, it was necessary to make several assumptions, in the event 
of an impact it is unlikely that the damage will extend only 
slightly beyond the side shell. It has also been assumed that in 
most cases it is unlikely that damage will extend across the full 
beam. Thus, the log-normal distribution has been used to 
represent the damage penetration distribution as this is probably 
the most accurate representation of the damage function 
(Przemieniecki, 1994). The probability that a damage penetration 
is less than a given penetration depth, b, is therefore;   
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Where RSK is the sure kill radius which means that d (RSK) =0.98, 
RSS is the sure save radius which means d (LSS) =0.02 and zSS is 
a constant equal to 1.45222.  
The methodology to account for the longitudinal subdivision in 
the calculation of pi uses the same basic equations outlined in part 
B regulation 7-1 of the SOLAS 2009 (IMO, 2006) probabilistic 
damage stability regulations.  
 
Vertical Distribution 
The vertical extent of damage may also vary depending on the 
weapon’s characteristics. In a surface combatant such as a frigate 
or a destroyer there are three watertight boundaries vertically, 
namely the tanktop, the damage control deck and the main deck 
(Fig. 2). Excessive vertical watertight boundaries are avoided by 
design as high flooding can lead to poor stability thus it can be 
favourable to allow lower decks to flood.  In the case of an air 
delivered weapon (e.g. Anti-Ship Cruise Missile) it will generally 
detonate close to the waterline causing greater damage above the 
waterline and the tank top will most likely remain intact. 
However, in the case of an underwater weapon (e.g. contact mine 
or torpedo) which detonates close to the keel, the damage control 
deck will likely remain intact from the blast. The problem with an 
underwater explosion is that modern under-keel torpedoes are 
capable of causing extensive damage to the hull girder of even a 
cruiser sized ship, often this is sufficient to cause breaking and 
sinking of the ship. Such cases are not covered in the proposed 
methodology, as the maintenance of structural integrity is a 
perquisite for the assessment of the ships damage stability.  
For a hit by an air-delivered weapon, a linear distribution for the 
probability density function of the vertical extent of damage can 
be used. Its maximum is at the main deck and the minimum at the 
keel, the opposite is valid for an underwater weapon. By 
considering the vertical extent of damage, the effect of the 
position of vertical watertight boundaries on the overall 
survivability of the vessel can be observed. In order to take into 
account both threats a weighting factor can be applied according 
to an operational analysis of the potential threats.  
SURVIVAL INDEX Si 
As previously mentioned the German Navy are the only navy 
known at the time of writing to outline a probabilistic assessment 
of survival after damage in their current criteria. In the case of BV 
1030-1 (BWB, 2001), the probability of survival after damage 
(W- value) is to be calculated if the outlined deterministic criteria 
are not met. Thus, if the criteria cannot be met through design 
measures or modifications, the vessel can still be approved if the 
risk is deemed acceptable. The probability of survival after 
damage (W) is calculated using sectional area probabilities. It 
does not represent the overall probability of survival as only a 
pre-determined set of damage cases are assessed as opposed to 
considering all probable damage scenarios. Although this method 
does not give an accurate representation of a ships probability of 
survival after damage, the German navy have recently developed 
a new set of probabilistic criteria.  
In this case, the presented approach used to assess the probability 
of survival after damage is a probabilistic quasi-static approach 
adjusted for the currently valid, semi-empirical deterministic 
criteria for naval ships (Boulougouris & Papanikolaou, 2013). 
Table 2. Probabilistic damage stability criteria for naval combatants 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Naval Ship Vertical Watertight Boundaries 
 
Fig. 1 Penetration lognormal damage function 
Q
roll = 25 deg Wind Speed = According to Defstan 02-900
A1 ≥ 1.4 A2 Min Freeboard ≥ 3in + 0.5(Hs(0.99) - 8ft)
si = P(Hs≤ 8ft)
Q
roll = 15 deg Wind Speed = According to Defstan 02-900
A1 ≤ 1.05 A2 Longitudinal trim < required to cause downflooding
si  = 1
Ship meets Defstan 02-900 damage Stability Criteria
si = 0
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The approach considers the probability of survival after damage 
and is based on quasi-static survival criteria such as those used by 
the Royal Navy and US Navy. These criteria were developed 
from real life damage incidences of WWII and although the 
current criteria have been under criticism as being outdated, they 
have proved reliable over the years and thus there have been no 
significant changes. One of the main criticisms of the current 
criteria is the fundamental assumption that the sea conditions at 
the time of damage are “moderate.” This constraint was lifted in 
the herein presented methodology, with the requirement for a 
specific survival sea state at the time of damage. 
This allows the correction of these requirements by consideration 
of the probability of exceedance of an 8ft wave height, which is 
considered as basis for the current deterministic criteria. The 
wave height is used in the criteria in order to define φroll, the roll 
amplitude due to wave action. It was also the underlying 
assumption behind the guidelines for establishing the watertight 
features/closures to prevent progressive flooding. Thus, any 
attempt to change the wave amplitude must take into account 
changes in both φroll as well as the margin line or equivalent.  
From Table 2, it can be seen that the criteria allow the sea state at 
the time of damage to be directly accounted for within the 
assessment. One of the parameters is Hs (0.99) which represents 
the significant wave height with a 99% probability of non-
exceedance for the specified area.  This wave height is used for 
the definition of maximum freeboard, which considers the 
probability of sinking without capsize in the criteria. In addition 
to Hs (0.99), the probability that an 8ft will not be exceeded, P 
(HS ≤ 8ft), is also specified. This parameter defines the probability 
of survival when the ship meets the current RN criteria.  
The wind speed is another important parameter which needs to be 
considered, however given the small probability of exceeding the 
values given by RN and U.S Navy standards, the values were left 
unchanged (approximately 33 knots for a 3500t frigate).  
Table 2 shows the criteria which were applied in the frame of a 
probabilistic approach to assess the survivability of a generic 
frigate. For intermediate stages, interpolant values can be used. 
Fig. 3 shows the meaning of various notions of the righting arm 
curve. roll is the rollback angle, from point D, which represents 
the roll amplitude due to wave action. Point C represents the 
initial heel angle after damage and point D represents the wind 
heeling arm equilibrium. 
In order to implement the criteria the following values can be 
used. For ships operating in North Atlantic, P(HS ≤ 8 ft) would be 
0.56 and 0.90 for the East Mediterranean Sea (Athanassoulis & 
Skarsoulis, 1992). For the North Pacific, P (HS ≤ 8 ft) would be 
0.42 (Lee, 1995) and 0.71 for the South China Sea (Haveman et 
al, 2006). Therefore, a combatant, meeting the U.S. Navy criteria 
for warships, should have according to the proposed criteria a 
56% probability of survival in the North Atlantic for a damage 
length not exceeding the current regulations (Ochi, 1978). This 
probability will increase to 90% probability of survival in the 
Mediterranean Sea and to 71% in the South China Sea. However, 
in the case of the North Pacific, the probability of survival will 
decrease to 42%. Obviously, a similar methodology can be 
introduced for auxiliary naval vessels. The minimum required 
values for compliance could be estimated after application of the 
above procedure to sample/existing ships. 
CASE STUDY 
The herein outlined probabilistic damage stability framework for 
surface combatants was applied to a generic frigate model, which 
was defined in the Maxsurf® package (Bentley Systems, 2013). 
The stability of the vessel was assessed using Maxsurf’s stability 
module. The ship’s main particulars are given in Table 3 and the 
3D hull model is shown in Fig 4. 
Table 3. Main Particulars 
The arrangement (Fig. 5) is typical for a frigate of this size with 
a centreline passageway providing an un-flooded route across the 
Main Particulars 
Loa (m) 148.1 
Lwl (m) 137 
Twl (m) 4.31 
Depth (m) 9.3 
Displacement (tons) 4528 
Fig. 3  Damaged Ship GZ Curve 
Fig 4 Frigate 3D Hull Model 
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full length of the damage control deck. The ship has two main 
engine rooms, one for two cruise gas turbines (GT) and the other 
for two boost turbines. In addition, there are two auxiliary 
machinery rooms forward and aft of the GT rooms. The internal 
layout of the frigate consisted of 13 watertight transverse 
bulkheads which subdivide the hull into 14 main compartments. 
Three decks form the horizontal watertight boundaries, namely 
the main deck (1st deck), damage control deck (2nd deck) and the 
tank top (4th deck) 
Initially the deterministic assessment was carried out in which all 
damage cases had to meet the criteria outlined in DefStan 02-900.  
The damage length specified (15%Lwl) resulted in a damaged 
length of 20.55m, thus the minimum length of 21m was used to 
define the damage cases. This resulted in mainly 3 compartment 
cases. Several different transverse extents were taken for each 
damage case including B/5, B/2 and penetration across the full 
beam to ensure to worst possible cases were considered. As the 
frigate model was designed to this standard, all damage cases 
fulfilled the criteria. 
In terms of the longitudinal extent of damage, initially up to 6 
adjacent zones were considered. However the contribution to the 
attained index of these cases were found to be negligible, thus 
damage cases up to 4 adjacent zones were defined in Maxsurf 
stability. The formulae for the calculation of the probability of 
damage occurring, pi, from equation 6 were applied to the basis 
vessel and the results for single compartment damage cases are 
given in Table 5. For the subdivision arrangement under 
consideration, 1 compartment damage cases were found to 
contribute approximately 27% to the attained index whereas 2, 3 
and 4 compartment cases contribute 60%, 11% and 1% 
respectively as shown in Fig. 6. 
 
Table 4. p factor for 1 compartment damages 
Transverse Distribution 
In order to develop a robust probabilistic framework for naval 
ships, systematic calculations must be carried out on a 
representative sample of ships, which comply with the current 
damage stability regulations. In this respect, a study was 
conducted in order to explore the effects of the damage 
penetration distribution on the overall survivability. The aim of 
this study was to provide insight into which distribution is most 
suitable for naval ships. 
Initially the lognormal damage function was altered in order to 
represent different transverse damage extents. The aim was to 
gain insight into how the damage penetration distribution 
influences the overall survivability. In the lognormal penetration 
distribution, the maximum damage penetration is expressed by 
RSS (Equation 7) which represents the 98th percentile damage 
penetration depth. For the study, damage penetrations up to the 
full beam of the vessel were considered. 
Several different maximum damage penetrations were considered 
ranging from 0.1B to B. This range across the full beam was 
considered in order to gain insight into the severity of 
asymmetrical flooding. The lognormal damage functions for 
several of the damage penetration depths can be seen in Fig. 7. 
A number of damage scenarios were ran for each of the 
distributions, with different maximum damage penetration (Rss). 
These are shown in table 4 along with their respective Rsk values.  
It was found that the sure kill radius (Rsk) had little influence on 
the overall results. Therefore, the minimum value of Rsk was 
used for each of the maximum damage penetrations. This was the 
minimum value which resulted in the integral of the lognormal 
damage function summing to one. For all the scenarios the 
operational area was taken as the North Pacific. 
Room NZ x1 x2 x1u x2u y Pi 
1 1 0 13 0.000 0.095 0.095 0.007 
2 1 13.0 23.5 0.095 0.172 0.076 0.011 
3 1 23.5 29.3 0.172 0.214 0.042 0.002 
4 1 29.3 41.1 0.214 0.301 0.087 0.030 
5 1 41.1 51.6 0.301 0.377 0.076 0.029 
6 1 51.6 62.0 0.377 0.453 0.076 0.036 
7 1 62.0 72.5 0.453 0.529 0.076 0.042 
8 1 72.5 79.5 0.529 0.581 0.052 0.011 
9 1 79.5 89.1 0.581 0.650 0.070 0.026 
10 1 89.1 102.3 0.650 0.747 0.097 0.046 
11 1 102.3 109 0.747 0.796 0.048 0.004 
12 1 109.0 117.6 0.796 0.859 0.063 0.008 
13 1 117.6 128 0.859 0.935 0.076 0.008 
14 1 128 137 0.935 1.000 0.065 0.001 
Fig. 6 Contribution of Various Damage Cases to the Attained 
Index 
 
Fig. 3Fig. 4  Contribution of Various Damage Cases to the 
Attained Index 
Fig 5 Frigate Arrangement 
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Initially the damage scenarios were ran for the deepships 
condition. Fig. 8 shows the attained index against maximum 
damage penetration (Rss) for these scenarios. It can be readily 
observed from the figure that there is only a small difference in 
attained index between the minimum (0.946) and maximum 
(0.959). The difference between these two points was found to be 
approximately 1.3%, thus in this condition asymmetrical flooding 
does not appear to significantly influence the survivability. From 
this loading condition, it appears that the lognormal function with 
a maximum damage penetration of either 0.5B or 0.6B is most 
suitable. For the scenarios where the maximum damage 
penetration is greater than 0.7B, the probability of occurrence of 
the lesser penetrations becomes negligible. Thus, the influence of 
asymmetrical flooding is not fully accounted for. Taking any 
maximum damage penetration greater than these values could 
therefore result in an over conservative estimate of a naval ships 
survivability.  
Fig. 8 also suggests that for the light seagoing condition there is 
a significant difference in attained index between the different 
maximum damage penetrations used. In this condition, a 9% 
difference in attained index was observed between the 0.5B and 
full beam maximum penetration damage extent. This illustrates 
that in the lighter loading conditions the effect of asymmetrical 
flooding can be more detrimental to the survivability of the 
vessel. Once again, the results suggest that a maximum damage 
penetration should not be taken greater than 0.6B as this can lead 
to overestimating the survivability of the vessel. 
 Due to the way in which modern warships are designed the 
damage penetration distribution does not have much influence on 
the deepships condition. Longitudinal subdivision is generally 
avoided, where possible, in naval ship design due to the large list 
angles which may develop following asymmetric flooding. Note 
that currently, the transverse penetration, which would result in 
the worst stability condition is used as criterion for naval ships 
and this differs from passenger ship requirements were collision 
damage is limited to B/2.  Due to these requirements, any 
longitudinal subdivision that could potentially lead to 
unsymmetrical flooding is avoided. For the frigate under 
consideration the asymmetrical flooding is the result of the tank 
arrangement. Hence, this is unavoidable highlighting the large 
differences in survivability for the light seagoing condition. 
Thus, when applying the probabilistic framework the most 
suitable distribution should be utilised. From the results the 
lognormal damage function with a sure save radius of 0.5B seems 
most practical. The results also illustrate that in order to further 
enhance the survivability of a surface combatant greater attention 
should be paid to limiting the longitudinal extent of damage either 
through optimal subdivision or with the use of blast resistance 
bulkheads. The results also suggest that asymmetrical flooding 
due to tanks has a negative effect on the survivability in light 
seagoing conditions however; it will be very difficult to negate 
this through design.  
Through the application of the probabilistic framework the 
designer can produce figures which can be used to easily identify 
weak points in design. For example the plot of 1-pi (1-K) against 
‘x’ as shown in Fig. 9 highlights cases where there will be 
significant damaged heel. Such figures can aid the designer in 
optimizing longitudinal barriers such as tanks.  
Rss Rsk Rsk/Rss 
0.1 0.01 0.100 
0.2 0.025 0.125 
0.3 0.04 0.133 
0.4 0.065 0.163 
0.5 0.1 0.200 
0.6 0.15 0.250 
0.7 0.22 0.314 
0.8 0.39 0.488 
0.9 0.64 0.711 
0.95 0.81 0.853 
0.99 0.96 0.970 
Table 4. Rss and Rsk Values 
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Fig. 8 Attained Index against Rss (Sure Save Radius) 
 
Fig. 5Fig. 6 Attained Index against Rss (Sure Save Radius) 
Fig. 7 Lognormal Damage Function for Various Rss Values 
 
Fig. 7 Attained Index against RssFig. 8 Lognormal Damage 
Function for Various Rss Values 
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Where, e is the equilibrium heel angle for the damage case and 
max and min represent the maximum and minimum allowable list 
angles following damage, which can be taken from the 
deterministic criteria. 
Operational Area 
In order to investigate the influence of operational area and sea 
state at the time of damage on survivability, three different 
operational areas across the globe were assessed in this study, 
namely the North Atlantic, North Pacific and South China Sea. 
The North Atlantic scenario was considered as this was the area 
of operation focused on by the RN, where warships such as the 
Type 23 were designed to conduct anti-submarine warfare; of 
course, the North Atlantic is also a prime operational area for 
USN ships.  The North Pacific and South China Sea were also 
considered: these areas were assessed due to increased tensions 
and territorial disputes in these waters. Although only these areas 
were considered in this study, the application of the present 
probabilistic concept and suggested criteria allows the inclusion 
of any operational area.  
The relevant sea state data for the operational areas under 
consideration is as follows. For the North Atlantic Scenario, we 
assume P (Hs≤8ft) = 0.56 and Hs (0.99) =10m, for the North 
Pacific P (Hs≤8ft) = 0.42 and Hs (0.99) =11.2m. For the South 
China Sea Scenario we assume P (Hs≤8ft) = 0.71 and Hs (0.99) 
=5.4m.  
The data for each of the operational areas were processed by the 
criteria shown in table 2. For the frigate under consideration at 
full load condition the attained index was found to be A=0.98 for 
the North Atlantic, A=0.95 for the North Pacific Scenario and 
A=0.989 for the South China Sea.  
A 3% increase in risk was observed when changing the 
operational area from the North Atlantic to the North Pacific. 
Although the survivability of the vessel under consideration is 
high for both operational areas this may not always be the case. 
The attained index may be satisfactory for one operational area; 
however, for other operational areas the ship may fail to meet the 
required attained index prompting the designer to take action. 
Thus, in order for the designer and operator to fully understand 
the performance of the vessel the most probable and high risk 
operational areas should be identified and assessed from the early 
design stages.   
The probabilistic methodology presented by Boulougouris and 
Papanikolaou (2004) allows for the application of a survivability 
envelope which defines a range of sea state conditions in which 
the ship is expected to survive.  
CONCLUSION 
Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2004, 2013) previously 
presented a methodology for the probabilistic damaged stability 
assessment of naval combatants and its application to design 
optimisation. This paper supplements their work by investigating 
the effect of the damage penetration distribution on the 
survivability. In addition, the influence of operational area has 
been studied further to observe the influence of changing the area 
of operation from the North Atlantic to the North Pacific.  
The study found that the damage penetration distribution is not an 
‘issue’ for surface combatants, as commonly any longitudinal 
subdivision that will result in asymmetrical flooding is avoided 
by design. It was found that the lognormal damage function can 
accurately represent the damage from an air delivered weapon 
and sufficiently account for asymmetrical flooding.  
The application of the presented methodology allows the use of 
more realistic operating conditions such as sea state at the time of 
damage giving the designer a better understanding of the 
damaged ship’s performance and limitations. The results 
observed when changing the operational area from the North 
Atlantic to the North Pacific showed a decrease in the probability 
of survival due to more severe environmental conditions. Thus by 
considering operational areas in the survivability assessment 
from the early design stages, the risk can be minimised to 
acceptable levels for all areas which are critical from a 
survivability perspective. 
Furthermore, the use of the presented methodology allows a 
holistic approach to be taken to surface ship stability. This allows 
the ship’s subdivision to be optimised for minimum risk, making 
survivability a distinct feature of the design. Combined with the 
more realistic operating conditions such as sea state, the approach 
will give the designer and operator a better understanding of the 
damaged ships performance and limitations.  
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